



The Metamorphoses of Civil Justice and Civil Procedure: The Challenges of New Paradigms—Unity and Diversity



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In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas corpora.

—Ovid, *Metamorphoses*.

Abstract In 1975, Mauro Cappelletti predicted a profound transformation in the area of civil justice. In his view, the complexity of contemporary societies required new and enhanced methods of dispute resolution since the traditional means were increasingly insufficient to address societal (and even civilizational) challenges. It is questionable, however, whether this transformation has indeed occurred. In order to evaluate Cappelletti's prediction, the present contribution addresses a selection of changes in the area of civil justice that have occurred since Cappelletti's prediction and tries to identify the driving forces of change. Subsequently it identifies seven main transformation areas in civil procedure, evaluating both their present impact on civil justice and their possible future effects. The relevant areas are (1) Transformation by borrowing from national and transnational sources; (2) Transformation by technological modernization; (3) Transformation by the reorganization of courts and a redefinition of court functions; (4) Transformation by the establishment of a multi-dimensional procedure for civil cases; (5) Transformation by the pursuit of alternatives to litigation; (6) Transformation by the collectivization of decision-making processes; and (7) Transformation by 'dejudicialization' (privatization, outsourcing) of judicial tasks. The contribution serves as an introduction to the papers collected in the present volume, written by authors from a wide variety of jurisdictions in Europe and around the globe.

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1 Introduction

In 1975, Mauro Cappelletti, the father of comparative civil procedure, published a text on the metamorphoses of civil procedure. This text, devoted to the protection of group and collective interests, starts with a promising first section: *Une révolution en cours dans le droit judiciaire civil* (Cappelletti 1975, 571). The essence of Cappelletti's submission on a 'profound transformation' or a 'véritable révolution' in the area of civil justice was the thesis that the complexity of contemporary societies requires new and enhanced methods of dispute resolution since the traditional means of individual redress are increasingly insufficient to address societal (and even civilizational) challenges.

Almost half a century later, Cappelletti's words still sound fresh—but only as a programmatic statement. As a description of the reality of national civil justice systems in Europe and the world, it can hardly be stated that they accurately depict the state of affairs in the first quarter of the 21st century. The main theme of Cappelletti's paper (and many of his other works), the establishment of adequate mechanisms of collective dispute resolution, is even today in an early stage. Doctrinal works produced on class actions, collective redress and the protection of group interests have rarely resulted in a broad and effective network of innovative judicial remedies. A revolution? A metamorphosis? Until well into the 21st century the new face of civil justice invoked by Cappelletti will be a wishful construct; new forms of judicial protection adjusted to process mass claims are—at least in Europe—not the reality but more like 'squeaking mice' (Harsági and Van Rhee 2014). The 'mighty cleavage' between private and public law (Merryman 1985, 91) is in most countries still present.

It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that, apart from a limited number of those interested in comparative law, scholars of civil procedure generally share the view that although civil justice does undergo changes, generally it does not radically alter its features—*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. The inherited forms of civil justice, and the traditional doctrine of civil procedure, are taken for granted. Referring to the well-established human right to a fair trial for any dispute concerning civil rights and obligations, many think that the residual court monopoly on dispute resolution should not be put in jeopardy. Indeed, public criticism of civil justice is every now and then lively voiced, but is that not something that also shows the cyclic nature of history, as since Shakespeare's time there have been those who have complained about civil justice due to the 'law's delay' (Van Rhee 2004).

Current developments may, however, prove that Cappelletti's statements on the need for a profound transformation of civil justice are not inaccurate, only premature. There is no single factor which leads to this conclusion—it is rather a conjunction of several processes both outside and inside state judiciaries. An important process is the change in the social context and the methods of human interaction that is bringing Cappelletti's need for a 'profound transformation' to a whole new level.

71 Cappelletti most likely wrote his text with pen and paper—or maybe a type-
72 writer. Back in 1975, personal computers were rare, and there were no mobile
73 phones and no internet. Messages were sent by regular post office mail, as even the
74 telefax did not acquire broad use until the 1980s and 1990s. With the fall of the Iron
75 Curtain, economic globalization expanded, and integration processes, both in
76 Europe and elsewhere, entered a new dimension despite all temporary difficulties.
77 In the past 50 years, the world population has more than doubled. A ‘profound
78 transformation’ can be noticed, but it is primarily a transformation of life outside
79 national courtrooms. How much did this transformation affect civil justice, which in
80 Cappelletti’s time was already in need of a profound change?

81 One thing is certain: the present situation is more troublesome and uncertain than
82 the picture painted by Cappelletti. The challenges have multiplied and intensified,
83 and public dissatisfaction with the operation of contemporary judiciaries has
84 accumulated. A *révolution véritable*, a rapid and adequate adjustment of civil
85 justice systems to the requirements of the new social realities in most countries
86 happened on a rather modest scale or did not happen at all. Where changes
87 occurred, they often came with considerable delay, lagging far behind the over-
88 whelming change in the social environment. It is well known that the national
89 systems of civil procedure have a strong link to particular or even parochial
90 characteristics specific to national legal systems and cultures (Deguchi and Storme
91 2008, 11) and consequently many reforms have been largely local and national in
92 spite of economic and political integration processes.

93 The reactions of judicial systems to change are not only slow and indecisive,
94 they are also going in rather different directions. For researchers of European
95 procedural law, the current perception of European legal systems is one of ‘unity
96 and diversity’ (Wijffels 2013, 14). In this introductory chapter, we will analyse the
97 driving forces that motivate the transformation of civil justice systems. We will also
98 try to synthesize several trends and reform processes in different jurisdictions,
99 seeking to find some unity in the diversity of transformations. Additionally, we will
100 show that the same unity and diversity is apparent in the contributions from dif-
101 ferent regions of the globe to the present volume.

102 2 The Driving Forces of Change in Contemporary 103 Civil Justice Systems

104 The diversity of contemporary judicial systems is largely due to the nation state that
105 promoted regulation, codification and an institutional framework exclusively linked
106 to the sovereign power at the national level. The civil courts have for the longest
107 period been immune to change, as they have their roots in the practices of local
108 legal communities and largely deal with private interests which are not the first
109 priority of national political elites [for a slightly different view, see Van Rhee
110 (2012)]. However, with the European (and global) economic and political

111 integration processes, the push towards harmonization and unification has become
112 more pronounced. This started in specific areas of substantive law, but gradually
113 also spilled over into procedural law, in the beginning limited to establishing
114 mutual trust and cooperation among European judicial systems while preserving
115 their specific features (Schwartz 2000; Gottwald and Klicka 2002). The basis for
116 cooperation and mutual understanding in the field of civil procedure is, at least in
117 continental Europe, also to be found in the common origins of the law of procedure
118 in Romano-canonical models, which formed a ‘procedural *ius commune*’ for many
119 European territories before the codification period (Van Rhee 2011; Petrak 2008).

120 The early projects aimed at harmonization (‘approximation’) of procedural laws
121 in Europe date back to the 1980s and 1990s (Council of Europe 1984; Storme
122 1994), but the trend towards producing ‘genuine’ European instruments of proce-
123 dure that not only deal with mutual recognition of judicial decisions but also create
124 new unified European procedures in civil matters (payment orders, small claims)
125 only started in the 2000s (Freudenthal 2010; Kramer 2010). Attempts to achieve
126 harmonization even removing the borders between the common law-civil law
127 divide also happened on a global scale, e.g. by way of defining common principles
128 and rules of transnational civil procedure (Hazard et al. 2001; ALI/UNIDROIT
129 2006).

130 One of the driving forces of harmonization of civil procedure was the global-
131 ization of the economy and the move towards increasing economic and social
132 welfare through international trade. In this context, a relatively high degree of
133 harmonization was achieved in the area of international commercial arbitration
134 through the work of UNCITRAL on model legislation and international rules, such
135 as the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration and the
136 UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (Sanders 2004). Another trend that has received
137 global attention is the use of alternative dispute resolution, which is a field where
138 both the UN and the European Union undertook important activities that were
139 intensified in the 2000s. In the EU, this development received particular attention
140 after the enactment of the Directive on Mediation (AIA 2008), and in great part also
141 due to the growing applicability of alternative dispute resolution in the context of
142 consumer protection (Hodges et al. 2012).

143 There are several reasons for the approximation of laws and practices in the area
144 of civil justice that are particularly important for Southern and Eastern Europe. One
145 of the reasons relates to problems with respect to delay and inefficiency of judicial
146 proceedings (Van Rhee 2004; Galič 2013). Others are connected with the common
147 heritage of socialism (Uzelac 2010). Some, especially in the Mediterranean coun-
148 tries, are the result of a history of dysfunctional court practices (Uzelac 2008).

149 In Western Europe, the excessive costs of litigation are the common driving
150 force behind a number of reforms that have become the focus of attention especially
151 in the past decade (Hodges et al. 2010). In any case, since the beginning of the 21st
152 century there has been a perception in many national civil justice systems of crisis
153 accompanied by common attempts to introduce a new approach to civil procedure
154 (Zuckerman 1999; Trocker et al. 2005). The establishment of a balanced system of
155 legal aid and assistance in which access to justice is guaranteed also for the

156 disadvantaged and legally illiterate members of the society is an issue in many
157 jurisdictions, also in reform attempts in Southern and Eastern Europe (Uzelac and
158 Preložnjak 2012).

159 Equally in the East and in the West, the sources of inspiration for legal reforms
160 are often drawn from the activities of transnational bodies. Among others, a frame
161 of reference was created by various documents of international organizations such
162 as the UN and the Council of Europe. An even more precise and compelling source
163 of motivation for reforms was the case law of transnational tribunals. For Europe,
164 the major source is the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in
165 Strasbourg, in particular concerning Article 6 of the European Convention on
166 Human Rights (Van Dijk et al. 2018; Uzelac 2013). Successful or promising reform
167 projects in other countries also play a major role: the global reputation of the
168 reforms of the English Civil Procedure Rules by Lord Woolf is a good example
169 (Andrews 2003; Van Rhee 2005; Gottwald 2010).

170 For some countries, a special source of reform involving harmonization was the
171 EU accession process. The establishment of rules which make domestic legal
172 systems of new Member States more compatible with the legal systems of existing
173 EU Member States is not so problematic. The biggest stumbling block is the proper
174 functioning of the justice system and ensuring effective and timely legal protection
175 [for an example from Eastern Europe, see Uzelac et al. (2013), Uzelac (2009)].

176 **3 The Forms of Transformation: Unity and Diversity** 177 **in Seven Polycentric Steps**

178 The metamorphoses discussed here are often not easy to spot and define. Why some
179 forms change in a certain way depends on multiple factors. The judicial transfor-
180 mations, as described in the preceding paragraphs, also occur due to different
181 factors and different local circumstances. Changes are sometimes subtle, sometimes
182 abrupt, and very often interconnected. Still, it is possible to distinguish seven main
183 transformation processes in civil procedure triggered by the contemporary chal-
184 lenges to the national justice systems. In the present introduction, these processes
185 will be ordered based on their intensity and impact, from 'soft' and more con-
186 ventional to more radical ones, including processes that may dramatically alter the
187 very substance of our understanding of 'civil justice'. In real life, often these
188 processes occur simultaneously and combined. Nevertheless, they can be distin-
189 guished and are characteristic of many legal justice systems irrespective of their
190 geographic or cultural location. There is in our opinion no relation of hierarchy
191 between the various forms or processes of transformation. The seven processes are
192 truly polycentric, as the policies of judicial reform can involve one, several or all of
193 them at the same time.

194 The seven transformation processes distinguished here are the following:

- 195 1. Transformation by borrowing from national and transnational sources;
- 196 2. Transformation by technological modernization;
- 197 3. Transformation by the reorganization of courts and a redefinition of court
- 198 functions;
- 199 4. Transformation by the establishment of a multi-dimensional procedure for civil
- 200 cases;
- 201 5. Transformation by the pursuit of alternatives to litigation;
- 202 6. Transformation by the collectivization of decision-making processes;
- 203 7. Transformation by ‘dejudicialization’ (privatization, outsourcing) of judicial
- 204 tasks.
- 205

206 These processes of transformation of civil justice systems are visible in various
207 contemporary legal systems, and their particular features largely depend on per-
208 ceptions of the goals of civil justice (Uzelac 2014). However, these transformation
209 processes are undeniably present, and concrete examples can be found in the
210 contributions to this volume.

211 ***3.1 Borrowing from National and Transnational Sources:*** 212 ***Change as a Legislative Mimicry and Transplantation*** 213 ***of Concepts***

214 The ‘softest’ and most conventional form of legal adaptation to new social cir-
215 cumstances is the borrowing of ideas from other legal systems. Comparative legal
216 historians have argued that ‘massive successful borrowing is common place in law’
217 (Watson 2000; also see Watson 1974).

218 While the notion of legal transplants can be controversial, it is certainly wide-
219 spread and originates in the past. It consists mainly of some form of emulation of
220 legal rules or principles, either by copying or by rephrasing and adjustment. One
221 may now ask whether there is anything decisively innovative in the legal transplants
222 pertaining to the functioning of civil justice in the 21st century. The method is old,
223 but a novel element is its universal application to national civil procedure and civil
224 justice systems (court structures and the legal profession). Some forms of proce-
225 dural transplants have indeed been undertaken in the past, with varying success,
226 such as the introduction of the German model of civil litigation in Japan in 1890, or
227 the literal translation of the Austrian ZPO in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.
228 But such all-encompassing transplants were more the exception than the rule. With
229 the start of the 21st century, the procedural reforms based on transplants from other
230 legal systems became mainstream, in particular where it concerns borrowing from
231 transnational sources. In Europe, for example, the reconfirmed European Union
232 competence in the field of civil procedure introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam
233 and expanded by the Treaty of Lisbon caused the Member States to regularly check

234 their internal procedural design from the perspective of compatibility with EU law.
235 Consequently, recent studies speak of a ‘Europeanization’ of civil procedure,
236 announcing the introduction of common minimum standards (see Manko 2015;
237 Tulibacka et al. 2016). The new case law of the European Court of Human Rights in
238 the interpretation and application of the fair trial rights of Article 6 ECHR became
239 indispensable in the reforms of civil procedure in a whole series of areas such as
240 fairness, reasonable time, the means of recourse, effective remedies, the effective
241 implementation of judgments and proportionality in the enforcement of civil
242 judgments [*inter alia* see Van Dijk et al. (2018), Uzelac (2013, 2009)].

243 In a way, issues that used to be strictly national (for instance payment orders, or
244 enforcement systems) are now increasingly ‘trans-nationalized’. In economic and
245 political integration such as ~~that~~ in the European Union (where the notion of
246 ‘cross-border matters’ became ubiquitous), the idea of mutual trust forces the legal
247 reformers to resort to comparative law whenever a new reform of civil justice is
248 planned.

249 Also, beyond membership in international organizations, procedural transplan-
250 tation is becoming an indispensable technique. For example, the ambit of influence
251 of EU law includes non-EU countries like Norway, among others, which follow the
252 European *acquis* without wishing to become fully bound by EU membership (see
253 *infra* the contribution of Fredriksen and Strandberg). In addition, the prospective
254 members of closed clubs—such as the accession candidates to the EU—treat
255 procedural models of the countries that have passed the test of compatibility in the
256 accession process as best practices. The European Union as such may also have
257 motives to regulate the judicial cooperation of its Members States with non-EU
258 states (see the contribution of Weller to this volume).

259 Beyond transnational integration, the echo of successful reforms undertaken
260 mainly for national reasons—like the Woolf reform in England and Wales—moti-
261 vates national legislators, both in Europe (as in the Netherlands) and on the other
262 side of the globe (as in Singapore, Hong Kong and China). There are mutual
263 influences. Just as England may be a source of inspiration for Germany, the latter
264 may be a source of inspiration for the former (cf. Gottwald 2010). The formation of
265 bodies for the evaluation of the national justice systems such as the CEPEJ
266 (European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice of the Council of Europe)
267 motivates states to compare their laws and regulations with the laws and regulations
268 of other states that are perceived to excel in efficiency and fairness. The easiest way
269 to emulate (more) successful or efficient states are ‘transplants’ from foreign law
270 even though these transplants sometimes ‘go wild’ (see the contribution of Galič to
271 this volume), create ‘legal irritants’ (Teubner 1998) and generally raise further
272 methodological issues (cf. Legrand 1997).

273 The principal agents of legislative borrowing that transform contemporary civil
274 justice systems are currently official bodies involved in international processes. If
275 scholars of civil procedure wish to retain their relevance, they need to study
276 comparative law. While this is only partially true today, it is quite likely that the
277 ‘transplantational’ nature of reforms in the national civil justice systems will
278 transform not only civil justice, but also civil procedural scholarship, which will



279 need to absorb comparative methodology, so far rarely employed in the study of
280 civil procedure. Comparative law becomes the engine of change for civil procedure
281 (Picker 2016). This trend is already noticeable in international projects for the
282 creation of model rules for national civil justice systems. The ALI-UNIDROIT
283 Transnational Principles are a genuine comparative product, which will be raised to
284 the next level in the ongoing ELI-UNIDROIT project that aims to produce
285 European Rules of Civil Procedure (Hazard et al. 2001; ALI/UNIDROIT 2006;
286 Uzelac 2017, 3–4).

287 3.2 Technological Modernization: From ‘Justice’ 288 to ‘E-Justice’

289 The challenge of keeping pace with technological developments is also funda-
290 mentally transforming civil justice. The nature of this transformation should not be
291 underestimated.

292 Technology today is not a tool which merely assists the administrators and
293 judges to do whatever they have been doing in the past but a tool which assists them
294 to do so with higher efficiency and lower costs. As described *supra*, technological
295 changes in the past few decades have led to a true ‘revolution’. The attempts of
296 national reformers to maintain traditional procedural forms, employing new ‘in-
297 ventions’ such as computers and video recording only superficially, have little
298 prospect of success in the long run, as such forms of legal process are (or will soon
299 be) perceived as hopelessly antiquated, in spite of the use of new ‘gadgets’. Modern
300 technology urges a fundamental transformation of justice systems, legal markets
301 and the law itself (Susskind 2003).

302 At present, civil justice systems still struggle with the adoption of fundamental
303 changes mandated by the developments of modern life, as is demonstrated by
304 contemporary studies on electronic technology (see Kengyel and Nemessányi
305 2012). Even the very idea of a fully ‘electronic’, paperless procedure is still con-
306 troversial, though the public at large has every right to expect completely digitized
307 proceedings, i.e. proceedings that are conducted by electronic means in all
308 important procedural steps—initiation of the proceedings, service of documents,
309 evidence-taking, hearings and decisions.

310 Moreover, the establishment of ‘e-justice’ (a fashionable and frequently used
311 notion in many states) should not create a justice system in which the ‘electronic’
312 element is an end in itself. Electronic litigation should not be just a functional
313 equivalent of the older, paper-based procedure. It has the capacity to fundamentally
314 change the procedure, just as paper-based litigation did not simply emulate but
315 fundamentally transformed oral procedures in the past.

316 Electronic litigation, if properly employed, can revolutionize all dimensions of
317 communication among the main actors in the lawsuit. The flow of information will
318 not only be speedier, but also more complete and productive. Immediate



319 communication is expedient, between the parties (or their representatives), between
320 the parties and the court (including the court administration and other legal services
321 and professions) and between different courts or their departments. Any decision
322 made in a pending lawsuit can be announced and delivered instantly.

323 Such an immediate flow of communication is instrumental for the fulfilment of
324 the goals of civil procedure. If all channels of communication are kept open, the
325 various steps in the procedure can be openly discussed among all participants, and
326 the ideal of an open justice system, in which the parties, their lawyers and the court
327 collaborate in the execution of a common task—i.e. the conduct of a quick and
328 inexpensive, but fair and accurate process—may be achieved. Electronic litigation
329 is thus an optimal tool to neutralize the disadvantages of both adversarial and
330 inquisitorial proceedings, contributing to a cooperative model that adjusts the
331 procedure to its substance and optimizes the use of the necessary resources while
332 reducing unnecessary litigation (Uzelac 2017; Van Rhee 2014).

333 Integral technological modernization as a form of thorough transformation of
334 civil justice also has further positive features. It presupposes a system in which all
335 necessary legal sources are freely accessible to and instantly searchable for the
336 interested audience, from applicable laws and regulations to case law and com-
337 mentaries. For the courts and lawyers it means that paper files are replaced by
338 electronic files, transcripts by video recordings and public auctions in courts by
339 digital bidding led by virtual auctioneers.

340 All of this has a number of side effects. The tremendous potential of new
341 technologies does not only enable accelerated and cheaper proceedings, it also
342 makes a number of conventional legal activities (and their agents) obsolete.
343 Massive court archives, impressive court buildings and administrative staff (such as
344 typists, drivers, administrators and bailiffs) may in the near future become unnec-
345 essary, replaced by only a handful of IT specialists. Moreover, the very essence of
346 some legal professions that have built their portfolios on the classic written pro-
347 ceedings is put into jeopardy. For lawyers there is an urgent need to ‘embrace new
348 technologies and novel ways of sourcing legal work’ in order to continue a prosper-
349 ous, and avoid a disastrous, future (Susskind 2008, 269). Many aspects of the
350 traditional operations of civil justice that are simple, routine and repetitive will be
351 replaced by some form of automation. This, indeed, has the capacity to transform
352 the profile of civil justice. In the future, civil justice will have to adopt a full
353 spectrum of new technologies in order to become more flexible, more cost-efficient
354 and leaner.

355 For many of the principal agents of the contemporary civil justice systems, who
356 for ages have been pampered with high demand and high esteem for the services of
357 their arcane profession—and abundant profits for low-tech legal work—this may
358 not be good news. When paper-based industrial society changes into technology-
359 based internet society (Susskind 2008), those professions which mainly survive on
360 paper-based services—public notaries are a prominent example—may have tough
361 times transforming, adapting, to new environments. However, adaptation is by no
362 means impossible. From history we learn that the traditional understanding of

363 notaries as agents who are exclusively linked to documents is factually incorrect, as
364 is demonstrated in the historical contribution by Milić to the present volume.

365 In any case, the fear of a transformation of the traditional legal professions is
366 certainly among the reasons why the transformation by technological modernization
367 happens in a slow, poorly designed and inefficient way in many civil justice sys-
368 tems. A second historical contribution to this volume provides an example of new
369 procedures which were intentionally disregarded by legal elites in order to protect
370 their imminent interests, thereby creating parallel and largely conflicting modes of
371 procedure in which, at least for the time being, the old modes were prevalent (see
372 the contribution of Held). But, just as in the past, in contemporary societies social
373 pressure is mounting, in particular in countries which have a history of slow and
374 inefficient courts and a low level of social trust in the traditional forms of justice.
375 Thus, paradoxically, new technologies are being introduced faster in these civil
376 justice systems which experience more dysfunctions than in countries where
377 judicial institutions are more trusted and their users more satisfied (see the contri-
378 bution of Karolczyk to this volume).

379 **3.3 *Reorganizing Justice: A Redefinition of Court*** 380 ***Structures and Their Functions***

381 The changes discussed above do not only affect the technological functioning of
382 civil justice. As has been stated, the organizational components of civil justice are
383 also affected. Starting with court structures, the introduction of new technologies,
384 enhanced means of communication and travel and a change in the profile and
385 number of cases are putting a redefinition of the role and function of courts on the
386 agenda, as well as the overall composition of court structures. This trend has
387 sometimes been referred to as 'developing a public administration perspective' on
388 judicial systems (Fabri and Langbroek 2000).

389 There are at least three dimensions to this reorganization process. The first
390 dimension is related to the size and number of court structures. In many countries,
391 the structure of the court network dates back to the 18th and 19th centuries. In the
392 light of new realities (such as better roads, faster trains, airplanes and instant
393 communication), it is legitimate to ask whether there is a need for a court in every
394 community, and whether, in general, the structure of the court network is adequate
395 for meeting the current justice demands.

396 The second dimension concerns specialization. While the transformation of court
397 procedures often rationalizes the influx of cases, it should be noted that in the future
398 the remaining court cases are likely to be more complex. One may ask whether this
399 should lead to the creation of new, specialized courts, or to some other forms of
400 specialization, depending on many factors. As several examples show (see the
401 contribution of Baboolal-Frank to this volume) the process of modernization of
402 court structures may result in a move in the opposite direction, i.e. to the creation of



403 a unified court system away from the decentralized and compartmentalized structures
404 as they exist today in many jurisdictions. Such an amalgamated court system
405 may bring advantages in terms of consistency, effectiveness and standardization of
406 court functions while preserving specialist skills and knowledge.

407 The third dimension is a conceptual one and deals with rethinking the role and
408 function of particular courts, especially those at the apex of the court pyramid. The
409 new approach to justice systems as a public service offered to its users under
410 favourable terms and for an affordable price motivates a reassessment of the role of
411 the courts in the judicial hierarchy. Can a system of state courts afford multiple
412 assessments of the same issue at three or more levels of adjudication? Should
413 supreme courts be used for a private function, in order to correct errors in the factual
414 and legal determination in a wide range of cases? The reforms of the supreme courts
415 both in the East and in the West demonstrate a trend which focuses the role of these
416 courts on specific, system-oriented issues. While this trend is not without difficulties,
417 it is not likely that it will be stopped. As demonstrated by various contributions
418 to this volume (see Bratković and Van Der Haegen), the past experience of slow
419 procedures, backlogs and the poor quality of supreme adjudication transforms the
420 very essence of the models upon which supreme courts are founded, shifting their
421 attention from the mass processing of individual cases to a narrower range of
422 systemically important issues, resulting in well-reasoned decisions of fundamental
423 importance for the rule of law.

424 ***3.4 Multi-dimensional Procedures: From Speed and Costs*** 425 ***to Proportionality, Access to Justice and Case*** 426 ***Management***

427 Technological modernization and court reorganization based on best international
428 practices logically leads to another fundamental procedural transformation: the
429 reshaping of the approach to cases processed by the civil justice system. The
430 keywords of many reforms in different parts of the world since the beginning of the
431 21st century are *proportionality*, *access to justice* and *case management*. All of
432 these notions are connected in the new, multi-dimensional perspective on the goals
433 of civil justice.

434 While the conventional doctrine of civil procedure almost exclusively focused
435 on substantive justice (i.e. on the accuracy of the decision-making process, the
436 fairness of the judicial processes and the consistency of judicial decisions), the
437 approach to reforms in the past two decades has raised to the same level of
438 importance the element of appropriate time (i.e. the speed of decision-making),
439 affordable costs (i.e. the reduction of unnecessary expenses) and the effectiveness of
440 the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments (the timely and complete
441 implementation of judicial decisions). There is a desire to distribute the means
442 which are at the disposal of the national justice systems proportionally, based on the

443 importance and social value of the matters at stake. This is not an entirely new
444 approach; its most authoritative and prominent example is Lord Woolf's 'new
445 theory of justice' in England and Wales (Sorabji 2014, 161–199).

446 Part of the proportionate allocation of resources related to the enhancement of
447 access to justice for the ultimate court users is the establishment of a system in
448 which the users will have a real and practical possibility to use the system in a way
449 that is appropriate to protecting their rights. In the context of austerity policies and
450 social priorities, the establishment of a legal aid system which does not merely
451 provide an attractive normative framework, but which is functional in practice can
452 be a significant challenge (as is demonstrated in the contribution of Brozović to this
453 volume).

454 Another way to promote access to justice is the creation of special proceedings
455 which can provide quick and affordable relief to a large circle of court users.
456 Among these special proceedings are summary proceedings for the certification of
457 uncontested debts such as payment orders, and special proceedings for the pro-
458 tection of consumers. As explained in the contribution of Stephanie Law to this
459 volume, one way to reduce costs and provide access to justice is to provide the
460 courts with more extensive *ex officio* powers to establish the facts relevant for the
461 protection of consumers. Indeed, for managerial judges with broad powers it is
462 essential to maintain impartiality. In this volume, a team led by Professor Fernhout
463 develop a method of assessing the predicted effectiveness of measures for safe-
464 guarding such impartiality.

465 **3.5 In Pursuit of the Best Alternatives: Consensual Dispute** 466 **Resolution and ADR**

467 A transformation of the approach to the goals of civil justice leads also to a different
468 attitude towards conventional civil litigation. Contentious civil litigation once upon
469 a time viewed as the pinnacle of the legal process—as a constitutionally guaranteed
470 default method of legal protection with which each dispute starts and ends—is
471 progressively regarded (at least by some scholars) as a costly and lengthy method of
472 dispute resolution which should be avoided wherever possible. If law is regarded as
473 a service industry and civil justice as another public service offered to the society,
474 then litigation should be used only where ultimately necessary.

475 If civil litigation is the ultimate remedy (*ultimum remedium*), what then is the
476 first and preferable remedy? As there is no need for state intervention where private
477 persons can resolve their problems autonomously and consensually, the first prefer-
478 ence of contemporary civil justice is a negotiated solution, reached either as a
479 result of direct contact between the disputants or with the assistance of a third,
480 neutral party in some form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).

481 As argued by Professor Marcus in his contribution to this volume, the ADR
482 movement in the USA was a 'reaction to costly and lengthy proceedings the United



483 States was coping with'. From the USA, this movement was exported to other
484 countries and has become one of the most common trends in practically all civil
485 justice systems worldwide. Invariably, national jurisdictions are today promoting
486 ADR, as exemplified by the contribution on Spain (see Gascón Inchausti), some-
487 times adopting rather innovative methods for special cases, such as family group
488 conferences (described by de Roo and Jagtenberg in this volume).

489 Admittedly, the results of the ADR movement are ambiguous. Only a handful of
490 jurisdictions have opted for mandatory ADR on a large scale, and this is contro-
491 versial (Lupoi 2014). The announced transformation has so far happened mainly at
492 a normative and doctrinal level, but the real effects on the reduction of contentious
493 cases and the expenses of dispute resolution are so far rather limited (De Palo et al.
494 2014). Two contributions to this volume criticize the ADR movement from the
495 perspective of the public goals of civil justice (see Marcus and Woo). Nevertheless,
496 it is certain that the ADR movement continues to contribute to the transformation of
497 civil justice, at least where it concerns a change in the culture of litigation and the
498 psychology of the litigants (and their lawyers).

499 3.6 *Collectivizing Decision-Making: Group Actions*

500 A global trend, optimistically asserted by Mauro Cappelletti in his 1975 text,
501 concerns the promotion of collective dispute resolution. Cappelletti's optimism may
502 have been based on the fact that in the United States class actions had been gaining
503 momentum since the second half of the 1960s. US class actions have a global
504 reputation and present one of the major hallmarks of the American civil justice
505 system which is still broadly used in spite of recent developments aimed at con-
506 straining some of its excesses (on 'patent trolls' see Marcus in this volume). Driven
507 by private interest, US class actions generally manage to be decent instruments by
508 which private law serves the enforcement of public interests. One of the remarkable
509 examples of the positive use of class actions—the bright side of class actions—is
510 presented in this volume in the contribution on human rights class actions (see
511 Silvestri).

512 Outside the United States, collective redress in Brazil has developed into an
513 important and widely used instrument. In Brazil, however, public bodies like the
514 Public Prosecutor's Office play a key role in collective redress. The *actio popularis*
515 based on Roman antecedents is still a common practice in this country. Even more
516 popular is the Brazilian-style class action (*ação civil pública*), in conjunction with
517 some other techniques, such as 'public civil inquests'. These secure a large volume
518 of Brazilian mass litigation (see Cruz Arenhart in this volume).

519 In the rest of the world, the (re)discovery of collective litigation is a by-product
520 of the transformative movements of the 2000s. Like the ADR movement in the past,
521 the 'collectivization' movement in civil justice is more likely to be present in
522 speeches, programmatic documents and academic writings than in everyday reality.
523 There are, however, no signs that promoting collective actions and other forms of

524 collective decision-making will fade away. In the contemporary world of massifi-
525 cation and automatization, it is somewhat logical to look for a functional equivalent
526 of mass industrial processing in a document-based industrial society, although the
527 mass processing of legal problems in a technology-based internet society can also
528 be achieved by other means. A number of countries have enacted laws on collective
529 redress. The Slovenian example shows that such legislation has a very high chance
530 of being perceived as a legal irritant, due to unprepared transitional judiciaries (see
531 Sladič in this volume).

532 In a limited number of areas such as consumer or financial services cases col-
533 lective redress is gaining ground. A combination that has proved to operate well in
534 the Netherlands is that of collective redress and ADR. Under Dutch law, some cases
535 of mass damages may be decided by collective settlements concluded under court
536 supervision. The experience with these settlements under the WCAM (Act on
537 Collective Settlement of Mass Damage) are analysed by de Roo and Jagtenberg in
538 the present volume.

539 **3.7 Outsourcing, Privatization and Other Forms** 540 **of Dejudicialization**

541 A final trend of transformation is ‘dejudicialization’. The notion of ‘dejudicializa-
542 tion’ is understood in this volume as encompassing all forms of a transfer of tasks
543 from courts and judges to other, non-judicial persons and services.

544 In the words of Margaret Woo, the trigger for ‘dejudicialization’ is ‘a renewed
545 call for minimizing costs and maximizing efficiency’ (*infra*). The starting point is
546 the insufficiencies of modern judiciaries, primarily ineffectiveness due to an over-
547 burdening of the court system with non-essential tasks. Another reason for deju-
548 dicialization are the costs of the performance of judicial tasks, which can be
549 considered excessive compared to the costs of some other, non-judicial arrange-
550 ments. Dejudicialization is comparable to (and partly inspired by) the business
551 strategy of outsourcing, by which companies subcontract their own internal activi-
552 ties to other, different companies.

553 In a broader sense, ‘dejudicialization’ can be either internal or external. Internal
554 dejudicialization means the transfer of particular tasks from judges to other court
555 staff or services. For instance, some time-consuming parts of the judicial process,
556 like arranging the service of documents or the drafting of decisions, can be allocated
557 to the court administration or to judicial assistants (for examples, see the contri-
558 bution of Gascón Inchausti to this volume). Similarly, simple and routine judicial
559 cases can be ‘outsourced’ to court clerks or land registrars. Such internal ‘out-
560 sourcing’ does not change the jurisdiction of the court, although it influences the
561 internal competences and the internal division of labour within the court system. In
562 a way, the promotion of (court-annexed) ADR as a replacement for civil litigation
563 can be viewed as a form of internal outsourcing, as court cases are steered away



564 from the judicial decision-making process (adjudication) to an extra-judicial dispute
565 settlement process (mediation), usually—but not always—conducted by profes-
566 sionals who are not judges.

567 A more radical form of dejudicialization is the transfer of tasks of the state courts
568 to the private professions or private companies. As noted in one of the contributions
569 to this volume (see Marcus), the ADR movement in the USA was a form of
570 ‘outsourcing’ the tasks of the public courts to the private sphere. In areas that are by
571 their very nature private, like family relations, dealing with relevant issues is more
572 appropriately done by private means. In this sense, mediation was found to be most
573 successful in the domain of family law according to studies by the European
574 Commission (de Roo and Jagtenberg in this volume).

575 A whole range of non-contentious cases can easily be ‘dejudicialized’, as leg-
576 islators generally have a certain latitude in distributing these cases to various bodies
577 or branches of state power. These cases are also the easiest to privatize. Recent
578 experiences with non-contested divorce and separation proceedings in France and
579 Spain show a trend of transferring such cases from courts to notaries (on Spain, see
580 Gascón Inchausti in this volume).

581 Dejudicialization is not only a blessing for overburdened judicial systems—it is
582 also an important warning for them. A transformation of civil justice systems which
583 transfers many of their functions to the private sphere can be a signal that these
584 systems are incapable of adapting to new circumstances. And, as an apocryphal
585 statement attributed to Darwin tells us, ‘It is not the strongest of the species that
586 survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change.’ In a
587 similar sense, if the justice systems do not adequately respond to the requirements
588 and expectations of the new age, their transformation may well mean their gradual
589 fading away. Such a prophecy might seem to be too radical, as billions of euros and
590 dollars are still being invested in civil justice systems, but the dominance of ‘public
591 court-based dispute resolution’ is undeniably shrinking. As noted by Gascón
592 Inchausti in this volume for Spain, civil justice systems are able to resolve average
593 civil and commercial disputes reasonably well, but obviously this begs the question
594 as to the ‘less than average’ cases.

595 If ‘average’ means cases that are average in size and complexity, the remaining
596 cases are either complex or high-value cases important for the national economies,
597 or small and routine cases which may be legally less interesting, but due to the high
598 volume of these cases still economically important. As regards both categories, the
599 public courts are rapidly losing ground, as is demonstrated in several contributions
600 to this volume. In high-value/low-volume cases, this is noticeable in the trends of
601 introducing mandatory pre-action procedures, the growth of international com-
602 mercial arbitration and the recent controversies about investor-state dispute reso-
603 lution. In low-value/high-volume cases, the courts and judges are being bypassed
604 through the introduction of (automated and digitized) payment order schemes, the
605 mandatory mediation of disputes and various private options for the collection of
606 small and uncontested claims.

607 Should one be worried, or should one welcome the trends of the shrinking
608 dominance of public courts in dispute resolution worldwide? On the one hand,



609 modernization has always changed our lives, whether we like it or not. If other
610 means of social regulation are better and more efficient than public courts, one
611 should not feel too much sorrow when some matters are taken away from con-
612 ventional civil dispute resolution. Many matters, in particular those related to the
613 processing of non-contentious cases, were only by chance, i.e. through accidents of
614 history, entrusted to courts. There are no good reasons for them to remain in court if
615 other agents—or sophisticated machines—can decide them in a better and cheaper
616 manner.

617 On the other hand, the extension of private and non-court mechanisms and the
618 diminishing role of the state courts cause certain risks ~~to appear~~ in contentious
619 cases. While ADR may promote access to justice, it can also jeopardize access. In
620 this context, Professor Marcus discusses in his contribution to this volume the risks
621 of mandatory ADR, and the even greater risks of mandatory private arbitration. In
622 the USA, where the privatization of justice has progressed further than elsewhere,
623 consumers are bound by clauses that force them to waive their right to public
624 litigation, and to arbitrate before consumer courts described as ‘kangaroo courts’.

625 Consequently, one should be wary of the risks that accompany the erosion of
626 access to public courts, and preserve and foster mechanisms that secure the equal
627 protection of rights, especially between litigants of unequal power, wealth and
628 experience. When dispute resolution schemes do not protect the rights of the
629 weaker party in civil cases, these schemes cannot be a good replacement for a
630 public and fair trial before an independent and impartial court of law. And, where
631 civil justice cannot be qualified as ‘civil’ and does not provide justice, legal
632 development is frustrated and at some point court users may resort to self-help.

633 4 Concluding Remarks

634 As has been demonstrated in this introduction, the global and European civil justice
635 landscapes show considerable unity but also extreme diversity. It is obvious that the
636 present changes in society and technology may have profound effects regarding the
637 way disputes are resolved either in court (public justice) or out of court (private
638 justice). In order to be able to compete with out-of-court solutions, the civil justice
639 systems provided by the state courts are in need of reform. So far changes have not
640 materialized on an all-compassing scale. Where changes have occurred it seems that
641 the various implications of societal and technological developments have not been
642 fully thought through (for example the implications of the availability of new
643 technology). It is the conviction of the authors of the present introduction that the
644 state courts serve important goals, not the least of which is in the area of the
645 development and interpretation of the law. However, this goal will come under
646 threat if the state court systems prove to be unable to meet the challenges posed by
647 changes in society and technology. Private justice will fill the gap and obviously
648 private justice will not be able to realize the public goals which state courts may
649 serve. The future will show whether the necessary balance between public and

650 private justice can be found, giving rise to a civil justice system where both the
651 private interests of the litigants and the public interests of society will be served in
652 an optimal manner, in part by way of out-of-court solutions, and in part by way of
653 the state judiciary.

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Part II

Impact of Regional and Global Developments: Cooperation, Borrowing, Transplants

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Preface

59 The civil justice systems of modern states are facing unprecedented challenges
60 today, and they are—in most cases, unsuccessfully—struggling to find appropriate
61 responses to them. At the same time, public confidence in the civil courts and their
62 ability to protect and enforce civil rights and obligations is fading. The need to
63 address this state of affairs through a broad international academic discussion is
64 clear.

65 This book is the result of academic research on the transformations of con-
66 temporary civil justice systems. The contributions collected in this volume come
67 from different regions of the globe, from (North and South) Europe to Africa and
68 (North and South) America. They share, nonetheless, the same wish to explore
69 whether the changes in the national justice systems appropriately address the needs
70 of the present time. Both historical and contemporary contributions indicate that a
71 profound change is now a *conditio sine qua non* for the survival of the civil courts
72 as the principal protectors of the legal rights of those under the jurisdiction of
73 modern nation states.

74 The core of this book is the research produced in the research project 6988
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77 researchers was reinforced by experienced, leading scholars of comparative civil
78 procedure, but also by young and promising contributors interested in the topic.
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