SUPREME COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
SHOULD ORGANISATION FOLLOW THE FUNCTION?

1. INTRODUCTION

In May 1997, the International Association of Procedural Law devoted its
Thessaloniki Colloquium to the comparative research on the national and
 supra-national supreme courts. This event, which produced a comprehensive
publication¹, gave a survey of global issues pertinent to the work of the supreme
courts at the end of the 20th century. Now, almost two decades later, it may be
time to see what has changed, and whether there are any new trends and develop­
ments that have changed the landscape of national judiciaries and their supreme
judicial institutions.

The dominant focus of the last IAPL attempt to deal with supreme courts
was on their role and function. However, in the conclusion of his general report,
distinguished professor and IAPL member, late Professor Tony Jolowicz noted
that “there is a substantial degree of consensus on the main topic [role and func­
tion of the supreme courts]”. In fact, he said, while we all agree that the supreme
courts must serve a variety of predominantly public purposes, the focus needed
to be shifted to the “How?” question.²

One of the important but generally less discussed aspects of the “How?” ques­
tion is the organisation of the supreme courts. Namely, if the supreme courts
aspire to fulfil certain special social goals a necessary precondition is to have
appropriate organisational structures, means and personnel to realise the defined
mission. And, in particular, if the court system is evolving, and some changes
in functions and purposes of the highest tribunals occur, it may have to reflect on
its organisation – or, on the contrary, the supreme courts may face the risk of fail­
ing to deliver what is promised due to inadequate framework for the new tasks.

² J. A. Jolowicz, The role of the Supreme Court at the national and international Level, (in:) Yessiou-Faltsi (ed.), The Role... (note 1), p. 63.
In this report, I will not provide an in-depth analysis of the various organisational elements that have an impact on the successful work of the supreme courts. Rather, I will only try to outline a few developments regarding the role and functions of the supreme courts that have become more prominent in the first decades of the 21st century, and point to the need for more thorough comparative and empirical research of their impact on the organisation of the supreme courts. As will be demonstrated later, some of those new functions are doubtless and stretch the institutional capacity of the supreme courts to successfully deal with them beyond the limits, therefore leading to the need for rethinking and, as the case may be, changing the course of development. On the other hand, some developments are ultimately inevitable and necessary, but invoke the need to adjust the organisational structures and introduce new organisational elements, while abandoning or reducing the existent ones.

In the second part, as an illustration of the possible comparative and empirical research regarding the organisation of the supreme courts based on the quantitative data analysis, I will examine information supplied by the European national judiciaries to the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). What will be extracted is the data on the number of the supreme court judges in national justice systems of the member states of the Council of Europe. Based on the comparison of data for selected sets of small, medium-sized and large European jurisdictions, some provisional conclusions regarding balance between the public and private functions in the European national supreme courts will be suggested for further discussion and research.

2. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING NATIONAL SUPREME COURTS: WHAT MAY BE CHANGING IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM?

As history teaches us, in judicial matters several decades usually do not bring revolutionary changes. The same is true of the developments regarding the supreme courts, which are among the most established (and therefore inert) judicial institutions. Still, we believe that, at least as a matter of quantity and intensity (if not as qualitatively wholly new features) some global and regional developments did have a more or less profound impact on the work of the highest judicial institutions in the past few decades. Such developments could significantly change the way in which they operate – asking for new organisational structures and methods of work.

The first change in the work of the national supreme courts is associated with the rise in the activity and the case law of the supra-national and international level. Though the courts such as the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and the Court of Justice of the European Union have existed since the 1950’s, the intensifying of their activity and production of the ever-increasing case law was raised to a much higher level since the late 1990’s and further on in the 2000s. Other international courts, especially related to international criminal law (ICTY, ICTR and ICTR), contributed to the internationalisation of matters that were earlier ending in the supreme national institutions. Thereby, the supreme courts are increasingly becoming less supreme, bound to pay more and more attention to the matters that were previously in the sovereign domain of their sound discretion in interpretation of legal norms. At the organisational level, this raises several new issues. On the one hand, the supreme courts need to be in a position to monitor not only its own case law, but also to follow the relevant case law of the supra-national courts that are in some matters undoubtedly “higher” than the highest courts in national judicial hierarchies. This demands creation of adequate services, and extension of staff and organisational units devoted to legal research. Ultimately, in the case of interpretation of some legal instruments, such as the EU law, the supreme national courts must have capacity and structures needed for reference to and dialogue with the international judicial institutions (eg. in preliminary ruling procedure, or in retrial of cases where the court in Strasbourg found violations of the European Human Rights Convention). Although most of the supreme courts today have some staff, department or office entrusted with legal research and analysis, the rise in importance of international jurisprudence is putting on the agenda the need for restructuring and reinforcing the existing departments. This development may have two-fold consequences: first, the supreme courts becoming less and less self-centred in their adjudication; and, second, the change in the organisation and methods of work by focusing on legal research and analysis of international and comparative law. The latter may mean the imperative of embedding units and departments entrusted with comparative research and monitoring of legal developments not only at the national, but also on the international and supra-national level. Some European supreme courts, such as German BGH, have made important structural changes in that direction. The BGH currently employs over 50 “scientific assistants” who prepare the work of judges and assist them in drafting judgments, using inter alia a court library of over 400,000 publications. Therefore, in a comparative study of the supreme court organisation, attention will have to be paid to the structures that are being set up to meet the demand of following international jurisprudence and case law, and to the way how their work affects the decisions of the highest national tribunals. Indeed, for all those who have not established

---

3 See Art. 267 of the TFEU. The notion of “European judicial dialogue” was introduced and used in the 2000s to describe the interaction of the highest national tribunals with the European judicial bodies (“vertical dialogue”). See e.g. C. Baudenbacher, The EFTI Court: An Actor in the European Judicial Dialogue, “Fordham International Law Journal” 2005, No. 28, pp. 353–391.

4 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter, or wissenschaftliche Hilfskräfte, see § 193 Abs. 1 GVG.
sufficient or comparable organisational units, this should serve as guidance and encouragement.

The second change that has an impact on the organisation of the supreme courts is connected with the technological revolutions, in particular to so-called digital revolution and information revolution. Though those notions refer to changes caused by the introduction of new technology that partly reaches back to the 1950's, it seems that most of the judiciaries around the globe relatively successfully resisted them until 2000s. However, in the 21st century not even the supreme courts, which are often strongholds of traditional, well-established methods and technologies, can remain immune to the changing world of internet, electronic communications and IT to which the users of judicial services have got accustomed. Superficial changes, such as the introduction of computers for the daily routine work, happened relatively fast. For more affluent judiciaries, the use of video- and audio-conferencing also became reality. However, the potential of technological revolutions that have an impact on the work and the organisation of the supreme courts goes far beyond these points. The trend towards designing an integral case management system for all courts (ICMS) poses natural challenges to the role of the supreme courts. The "integral" systems as such need unified management and professional supervision that cannot be left to technical experts. The clash between often fuzzy legal logic and stringent mathematical logic of digital systems, and the potential incompatibilities of various systems introduced in different times by different actors invoke a need for one central, highest institution that would secure interoperability and uniform application of new technologies across all judicial bodies. These tasks may be partly in the domain of executive bodies (eg. ministries of justice) or the special services (eg. councils for judiciary), but the central role of the Supreme Courts in the supervision of the work of the lower courts and secure uniformity of their work naturally calls for its active participation, if not leadership. On the other hand, the Supreme Courts are facing the challenge of adjusting their own practices to the new case management systems. They offer much faster and more complete insight into the work of the lower bodies of the judicial hierarchy (including instant statistical monitoring and reporting), and thereby enable more accurate and speedy reaction to diagnosed problems. Nevertheless, they also raise public expectations in terms of speed and transparency of the work of all actors, including supreme courts. Not only that the standards of work change with technological revolutions, but new work arises as well. The information components of the technological revolutions calls for publication of case law in electronic databases. One of the new functions assumed by (some) supreme courts is in the establishing or supervision of on-line publication systems for court judgments – at least of those of the Supreme Court, but often also of the other high tribunals. The effective maintenance of these information systems, user-friendly policies and practices, and good search engines are becoming an important part of the services that are provided by the highest national judicial bodies. They also call for the adequate organisation, able leadership, good IT departments and close cooperation with other institutions and bodies within and outside of the judiciary. Taking into account the composition of the Supreme Courts, which are in many countries staffed by senior career judges whose professional training and socialisation date back to the times much before the technological revolutions, the challenge of new technologies may be considerable. All these factors should be discussed more thoroughly in the future comparative work on supreme courts.

Finally, the third change that is happening to the supreme courts has a more complex and diffuse nature, and is of a more political than a legal or technical origin. It deals with the regional and global trends in the understanding of the concept of judicial independence, and the resulting shift in powers that presses the supreme courts to assume more powers and responsibilities for the overall administration of justice. At least in Europe, it seems that for many jurisdictions, in particular those from post-socialist countries (but not only them), the emphasis put on the independence of judiciary resulted in the evolving idea that judiciary should not only be independent in the adjudication of cases (functional independence), but also independent in its own management (organisational or corporate independence of judiciary). The proof for this submission comes both from the common and civil law jurisdictions. The formation of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, that has assumed all judicial functions of the House of Lords, was motivated by the wish to enhance the separation of judicial, legislative and executive powers by organisational measures. In the rest of Europe, the trend of establishing High Councils for Judiciary, or broadening of their competences, is also motivated by the idea that judiciary should be self-managed (autogoverno della giustizia). While not entering into discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of this trend, it should be noted that supreme courts have also been affected by it, though differently in different countries. The common denominator is the tendency to intensify the engagement of the supreme courts in the decision-making on matters that are not strictly of judicial nature, but affect the work of the national judiciary and have an impact on the overall administration of justice.

---


6 A special attention should be devoted also to the role of the supreme courts in eventual selection of leading cases (or cases that will appear in the on-line database), or the policies applied by the court regarding summarisation, anonymisation of judicial decisions, timing and other aspects of publication of case law. Some of these elements were controversial in Croatia, and it was argued that Court's department for monitoring of case law (evidenca) assumes too broad informal powers in selecting "good" and "bad" law of the court.
A borderline example is the engagement of the supreme courts in the fight with delays and backlogs in the national judiciary. Namely, one of the inherently modern means of intervention into cases that last excessively long in various jurisdictions (among them Croatia and Poland) is the one inspired by the case law of the ECtHR, and has *prima facie* judicial nature. It is the ruling upon individual petition ordering the lower courts to accelerate the proceedings and/or pay just compensation for the fair trial violation, which may be issued by courts of higher jurisdiction, including the supreme courts. The statistical share of such cases has recently become considerable in some countries, raising also the organisational issues (eg. who should deal with them, as such cases are usually regarded as too simple or trivial for the supreme court judges).

However, the involvement of highest courts in speeding up the cases at lower courts may take other, more policy-related forms. In Croatia, the Supreme Court and its president launched in 2006 a project on the reduction of “old cases” (defined as all cases lasting over three years). The project involves monitoring of these cases, their assignment of higher priority in case-flow (*inter alia* marked by issuance of “red covers” for these case files), and the need for regular periodic reporting by lower courts on the resolution of these cases.

Activities of the Supreme Courts in the area of securing the right to trial within reasonable time in principle require only moderate organisational adjustments (eg. special judicial formations for speeding up applications; engagement of law clerks or temporary assignment of judges of lower courts; administrative offices for statistics on time-management in lower courts). Considerably more demanding may be the transfer of the powers to the supreme courts in the domain of financing of judiciary and creation of court budgets. In Slovenia, in 2000 the Supreme Court assumed the highest power for the financial distribution of means acquired from the state budget, based on the “lump-sum” awarded by the government. The Supreme Court thereby became the highest body of financial autonomy in the Slovenian judiciary, again with the argument that such an autonomy is beneficial for the (corporate) judicial independence. However, this move required the establishment of general financial services and the adjustment of a number of departments of the Supreme Courts.

Finally, another trend that may be diagnosed in some jurisdictions is in the more intensive participation of the supreme courts and its judges in the design, interpretation and amendments of the statutory law, not via adjudication in concrete cases, but in a more abstract manner. Here, we can distinguish softer and indirect forms from direct, mandatory form. One way of influencing the design of legal norms and their interpretation is in the institutional participation of the Supreme Court or its members in the drafting committees and other bodies entrusted with legal reforms.

Another way of influencing the case law without being active as adjudicator in concrete cases may happen when supreme courts arrange meetings with judges of lower courts and discuss issues that occur or may occur in their practice. The practice of regular meetings with the judges of lower courts is a regular feature of Russian courts, where it has become a customary occurrence as to have an impact on the architecture of court buildings – all larger federal courts dispose of conference or congress facilities which are big enough to assemble all or almost all judges of the lower courts. A softer, but equally effective form is taking place when the Supreme Court or its members participate in the programmes of education and professional training of current and future legal professionals, or sit on the examining commissions that control the entry to the judicial and other legal professions. These activities provide an opportunity for setting forth the law and expressing opinions on its purpose and meaning, they also reinforce the institutional monopoly of the supreme court judges on the construction of national legal rules. However, there may be other, more direct ways as well. Some supreme courts in Europe and Asia maintain the practice of issuing practice directions, decrees and opinions that regulate certain fields or interpret the law. They may be phrased in an abstract and impersonal way, outside of any concrete pending cases, and often have a binding force for all judges. Such general decrees and opinions are regularly issued by the larger formations or even the plenary session of the court, and thereby even in their outer shape resemble the legislative process. All these extended non-adjudicative ways of influencing the law are being legitimized by the argument that they are necessary in the interest of the public purpose of the supreme court, i.e. in the interest of securing uniform application of law. However, it is questionable both whether the supreme courts are institutionally capable of producing good and consistent drafts of general legal acts, and whether this encroachment into the functions that are normally reserved for the legislative branch of government is compatible with the constitutional norms of the states that recognize the doctrine of separation of powers. We may be reminded here on the wise words of Jolowicz, who argued that “since Supreme Courts are courts, any contribution they may make to a public purpose is, and must continue to be, by way of their decisions in actual live cases.”

---


---


10 Indeed, if this is not the case, like in PR of China, the Supreme Court openly and without any reservations accepts that it has overlapping jurisdiction with other government bodies.

11 J. A. Jolowicz, *The role of the Supreme Court at the national and international level*, (in:) F. Yessiou-Faltsi (ed.), *The Role...* (note 2), p. 62. Admittedly, some encouragement for stepping the thin line between a “court” and another government body may be found in the recent
3. SIZE MATTERS: DOES THE NUMBER OF SUPREME COURT JUDGES HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE COURT'S ABILITY TO REALISE ITS PUBLIC PURPOSE?

The trends and developments described in the previous chapter may be significant for the present and future of the supreme courts and their organisation, but the core of the work of the supreme courts is, and will remain to be, fulfilment of its main functions by adjudication of individual matters. In the approach of the supreme courts to this main area of work, the most essential issue raised in comparative analysis is the balance between the two different kinds of objectives which the supreme courts seek to achieve, defined through the notions of “public” and “private” purposes of the exercise of their jurisdiction. It is commonly held that, at the supreme court level, the public purpose of clarification, unification and development of the law should play a prominent, if not exclusive role. On the other hand, it is also manifest that many supreme courts, in particular in the civil law tradition, still devote a large part of their activities to private purposes, i.e. to resolving disputes in which the private interest of the parties – dispute resolution according to law – dominate. In extreme cases, such as in Italy, the private purpose is elevated to the level of constitutional principle according to which anyone has a right to have his or her case heard and adjudicated by the Supreme Court (Corte di cassazione). It seems that the comparative research suggests that, at least for those countries in which the crowded dockets adversely affect the ability to deal with really important matters of general importance, more attention should be paid to the public purpose. As Jolowicz observed, “it is manifest that a Supreme Court will be unable adequately to fulfil its public role if its judges do not have the time for full discussion and reflection on the complex problems they have to consider”. However, there are different ways to cope with the larger number of cases imposed by the shifting of balance in favour of private purpose. One of the ways is to employ a larger number of judges and create larger organisational structures that could cope with the high number of incoming cases. The highest tribunals, which are more restrictive and concentrate on their public function, may need a significantly lower number of judges. From that perspective, it may be interesting to compare the composition of the supreme courts and analyse the relationship between the number of judges and the dominant role and function of those courts. Apparently, legal issues really important for a legal community do not depend on the size of the jurisdiction, so that, irrespective of the population or territory covered by the court’s jurisdiction, they may be discussed and decided by a relatively small number of judges. But if a supreme court is invited, or even bound to hear individual cases selected by mechanical criteria (value of the type of case), it is to be expected that bigger jurisdictions should need more supreme court judges than those whose population is smaller.

A relatively complete and representative comparison of the number of supreme court judges in the European countries can be derived from the reports of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. Within its evaluation rounds, one of the issues that is subject to the reporting of the competent state authorities is the number of judges at various levels. Based on the official reports of the national correspondents based on the uniform scheme for evaluating judicial systems, the CEPEJ assembles its regular bi-annual surveys that evaluate European judicial systems (EJS reports). Among other data, distribution of professional judges between various levels of jurisdictions, including the supreme court judges, is analysed and presented. For instance, in the latest EJS report (Edition 2012 based on the 2010 data), one of the figures presents the ratios of judges of lower courts (first and second instance) and the supreme court judges.

The CEPEJ report demonstrates interesting divergences in the ratio of lower and higher court judges. However, it does not analyse the data on the absolute number of the supreme court judges, and neither does it put these figures in relation to the size of the particular jurisdiction. However, the raw data are available and may be extracted from the national reports of particular countries, which is publicly available. In the next table, these data are presented in a shortened and partly modified form. The number of European jurisdictions has been reduced, and includes a selection of small, mid-sized and large jurisdictions from all sides of Europe; for reasons of comparison, some representative common law jurisdictions, such as those of the United States and Australia, are added (marked with*). The states that made remarks and reservations, such as the United Kingdom (England and Wales) and Russian Federation, are marked with**. Finally, a separate figure for the Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof) has been added, and shown together with the declared German figure on the number of supreme court judges, that is calculated on the bases of total number of all judges in the five German highest courts.14

developments regarding the powers of the European Court of Human Rights. By the Protocol 16 to the European Convention the ECHR will be granted the right to issue advisory opinions on questions of principle upon request of highest courts and tribunals of the CoE member states. The opinions of the Court will not be binding, and should build upon its “constitutional” role, but this development may anyway sparkle new initiatives to give comparable powers to national supreme courts vis-à-vis the lower courts in judicial hierarchy. It may be noted that Protocol 16 stays in contradiction with the previous ECHR practice to avoid using its authority to issue advisory opinions under Art. 47 of the ECHR.

12 J. A. Jolowicz, The role of the Supreme Court at the national and international level, (in:) P. Yessiou-Faltsi (ed.), The Role..., p. 56.

13 See http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/profiles/default_en.asp.

14 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) in Karlsruhe, Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG) in Leipzig, Bundesfinanzhof (BFH) in Munich, Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) in Erfurt and Bundessozialgericht (BSG) in Kassel.
Table 1: Population, number of judges of the supreme courts, population per judge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No. of SC judges</th>
<th>Population per SC judge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia*</td>
<td>21,507,717</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,072,531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,839,905</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>401,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3,843,126</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>40,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>7,364,570</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>42,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4,412,137</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>110,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>804,536</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>61,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>10,517,247</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>45,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55,200,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (CEPEJ data)</td>
<td>65,026,885</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>194,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (only BGH)*</td>
<td>81,751,602</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>89,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>11,309,885</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>41,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>60,626,442</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>205,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3,560,430</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>75,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>35,881</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>620,029</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>16,655,799</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>438,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4,920,305</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>246,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38,200,000</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>214,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10,636,979</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>125,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>21,431,298</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>198,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation**</td>
<td>142,914,136</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>876,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,050,189</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>45,989,016</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>582,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9,415,570</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>241,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>72,561,312</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>261,954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States*</td>
<td>309,300,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34,366,667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows considerable variety and range of figures: while some countries have less than ten supreme court judges, other have declared almost a thousand. However, if very small jurisdictions (Cyprus, Monaco, Montenegro) and common law countries are excluded, and Germany is counted only according to the number of BGH judges, the divergences are reduced to about 1 to 15 ratio (from about 20 judges to about 300 judges). Here is the grouping of countries according to the above criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Population Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia, US, UK (E&amp;W), Cyprus, Monaco, Montenegro</td>
<td>Less than 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway, Belgium, Slovenia, the Netherlands, Sweden, Croatia, Moldova</td>
<td>From 20 to 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain, Portugal, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>From 50 to 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania, Germany (BGH), Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Poland</td>
<td>From 100 to 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic, Greece, Turkey, Italy, France</td>
<td>Over 200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sorted this way, the table reveals a lot of similarities in legal traditions and history among the grouped countries. The countries with less than 20 SC judges are either extremely small jurisdictions, serving few hundred thousand people (Monaco, Montenegro), or belong to common law tradition (UK, US, Australia), or both (Cyprus). The group of countries between 20 and 50 SC judges includes Northern Europe – Scandinavian countries, Belgium and the Netherlands, and some smaller European jurisdictions (Slovenia, Croatia, Moldova – all with less than 5 million inhabitants). In the group between 50 and 100 SC judges we find the South-West of Europe – Spain, Portugal, Bosnia and Herzegovina (in which a very high number of supreme court judges is attributable to its peculiar – and dysfunctional – constitutional design). Countries between 100 and 200 SC judges include Germany (only BGH) and some larger post-socialist states (Romania, Russian Federation, Bulgaria and Poland). Barely escaping the previous group, Czech Republic is in the group of countries with over 200 judges. There, we find the large European countries of the “cassational” model, such as Italy and France. Ominously, among them are some other South-European countries, such as Greece and Turkey.

The selected jurisdictions widely differ in size and population, and range from Monaco – a country of barely 35 thousand inhabitants, to the US that has almost ten thousand times bigger population. In order to inquire what is the impact of size of population on the size of supreme courts, the next table puts into relationship population and number of supreme court judges, showing the size of population per one supreme court judge, as well as ranking of the country in terms of population.

Table 2: Ranking of the countries according to the population served by one supreme court judge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population per one SC judge</th>
<th>Rank (Population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>34,366,667</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales</td>
<td>4,600,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3,072,531</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>876,774</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (only BGH)</td>
<td>633,733</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>582,139</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As expected, the extremes in this table are even further apart: while one judge of the supreme court of Monaco serves less than 2.5 thousand people, in the US one SC judge comes on every 34.4 million inhabitants.

Does this also confirm that supreme court judges in larger jurisdictions inevitably have to serve larger number of people than in the smaller ones? A certain soft tendency to confirm this submission may be seen in the lowest (Monaco, Montenegro) and the highest (US, Russia) rows of this table. But all other data are too diverse to support this conclusion. The millions of inhabitants per supreme court judge at the top of the table are attributable rather to legal tradition and the special function of the supreme courts in common law countries than to their sheer size or population. Equally, the relatively low population-per-judge figures in the lower part of the table can be attributed rather to geographical and cultural factors, than to the small size of the country. The fact that the countries with less than 100 thousand per SC judge include mainly the South of Europe (post-Yugoslav countries, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus) can be proof of this. Also, few large European jurisdictions, such as Italy, France, Romania and Portugal, still belong to the lower part of the table, which is due more to their common judicial history (‘Romanic’ cassational model) than to their relative size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population per one SC judge</th>
<th>Rank (Population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>438,311</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>401,478</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>261,954</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>246,015</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>241,425</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>214,607</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>205,513</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>198,438</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>194,110</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>125,141</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>110,303</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (CEPEJ data)</td>
<td>89,356</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>75,754</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>61,887</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>55,411</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>45,529</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>42,083</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>41,888</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>40,033</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>34,446</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>2,392</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having said all that, we may conclude by some questions and statements that can be taken as a challenge for further research.

1. Does this analysis indicate that the judicial bodies called “supreme courts” and their members called “supreme court judges” are even more different than we originally thought, so that we should refrain from treating them as similar or even comparable? Perhaps not... completely. However, these differences should caution us against resorting too early to premature comparisons. They also need further research and analysis.

2. Can we take the fact that, unlike their common law counterparts, supreme courts of civil law countries are composed of dozens or hundreds of judges as a proof that these courts still predominantly serve the private purpose, with only moderate inclination towards public purpose? Again, it is not proven... fully. But the number of systemically important legal issues is not inexhaustible, and in order to keep a systemic perspective, one should keep it manageable.

3. Can we expect that a court with a high number of judges will make a decisive turn from private to public purpose? Perhaps... but not very likely. It is undoubtedly more difficult to have uniform views and decisions on important legal and social issues in a court with 300 judges than in a court with 10 judges. Thus, the wish to engage in consistent interpretation and development of law and uniformisation of the case law of lower judicial bodies while observing and developing your own case law imposes difficult organisational challenges in large courts, where a plenary debate and mutual interaction of all judges is impracticable and almost impossible. In addition, once daily routine in adjudication of repetitive matters prevails, it is difficult to adjust to the idea of having to develop law and reinvent new rules and principles in every case.

4. Finally, is there a link between the organisational elements, such as the number of judges and the population they serve, and the efficiency of the court work? Can we conclude that, paradoxically, smaller supreme courts whose judges serve more people are in fact more efficient than big courts with a large number of supreme court judges? There has not been any conclusive evidence for that submission... yet. Still, analysing the population-per-SC-judge table, it may seem striking that the lower part of the table more often than not contains countries that experience more or less permanent crisis in their judicial systems with issues such as trial within a reasonable time or efficient protection of individual rights. Looking at the top side, there are few jurisdictions that experience problems of such nature. Of course, one may argue that the blessings of efficiency come at considerable expense: that many of those who might have been able to assert their rights in the highest judicial instances have been deprived of their right of access to justice. Is this true or not, is another question. It is hard to say that Australian or American citizens are more deprived of their access to justice then citizens in Greece or Bulgaria only because their supreme courts have much stricter filters for incoming cases. On the contrary, just like with the Holy Grail, it seems that
citizens have more trust in the courts that are exclusive, unique and – to a certain level – elusive and hardly reachable.

Nevertheless, this opens a wholly different story, which may also need further comparative and empirical research, this time of a different kind. Short of venturing on that journey, allow me to end this speech with another provisional conclusion. A true challenge to the supreme courts in the 21st century, both organisational and functional, will be to maintain effective work, concentrating on really important cases, but at the same time not sacrificing public confidence to the justice system and their own public image of transparency and accessibility. The legend of Johann William Gravenitz, the Miller of Sanssouci, speaks of a citizen who, being threatened by an angry king (Frederick the Great), expressed pride and defiance, confident that his rights will be protected by the “Supreme Court in Berlin”. Just as in the 17th century, the citizens of the 21st century must not lose their confidence (even if illusionary one) that, ultimately, “their” Supreme Court will defeat injustices.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


**KEYWORDS**

Supreme Court, organisation of the Supreme Court, work efficiency in the Supreme Court

**SŁOWA KLUCZOWE**

Sąd Najwyższy, organizacja Sądu Najwyższego, efektywność pracy w Sądzie Najwyższym
THE SUPREME CASSATION COURT OF THE NETHERLANDS

The Dutch Supreme Cassation Court has jurisdiction in civil, criminal and tax matters. The court is based in The Hague, not the capital but the administrative centre of the Netherlands where the government is based as well. The Netherlands is a medium sized European country with ca. 17 million inhabitants. The Supreme Cassation Court of the Netherlands is also charged with cassation appeals against judgments of the Joint Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius (overseas territories in the Caribbean) in the fields of criminal and civil law.

The court was founded in 1838. It took its name from a court that had been established in the 16th century but that had been abolished in 1795 under French influence. Between 1795 and 1838 several other supreme courts existed, but these will not be discussed here. In administrative litigation (apart from tax matters), the supreme court does not have jurisdiction; other courts have been established for a final decision in administrative cases: the Central Appeals Council, the Trade and Industrial Affairs Appeal College and the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State. These three courts are appellate courts, not courts of cassation.

The 1838 Dutch supreme court adopted the French model of cassation. However, some improvements were introduced in the 19th century, such as the lower court being bound by the judgment of the cassation court directly after the first cassation appeal.

During the 19th century, the court was not regarded as being very relevant in the Dutch judicial system and it was stated by various authors that it could better be abolished. This has changed during the 20th century and currently the Dutch supreme court is one of the most prominent courts in the country. Being appointed as a judge in this court is considered to be a great honour. The judge's salary is public like the salary of all civil servants in the Netherlands. It is comfortable but not excessive.

The Supreme Court is responsible for its own managerial and operational tasks. The Supreme Court, the Procurator General and the Director of Operations are in charge of this; the Dutch Council for the Judiciary is not in charge of the supreme court; it is only in charge of the lower courts.

In the first eighty years of its existence – from 1838 till 1918 – the Supreme Court of the Netherlands consisted of two chambers or divisions: the civil chamber and the criminal chamber. During that period the civil chamber also heard tax cases. Mainly as a result of an amendment of the law in 1914 however, the number of these cases grew so substantially that a third chamber had to be established. This chamber is now known as the fiscal or tax chamber, but originally it was called administrative chamber. Only the fiscal or tax chamber is divided in two sections.

Each chamber consists of: 2 vice-presidents and approximately 10 judges, 5 to 10 advocates general, approximately 35 members of the legal research office and administrative support. In each chamber some of the members are specialists, others generalists. As a rule the generalists are career judges. In the group of specialists one finds law professors, lawyers, tax consultants and also some career judges.

The civil chamber (also known as the first chamber) deals with ca. 550 cassation appeals per year, and the average duration of such an appeal is 550 days. The chamber is responsible for civil cases, including commercial and family law cases. This chamber also deals with many cases that do not fall under civil law in the strictest sense, for example those pursuant to the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admission) Act. The tax division deals with 1,100 cases per year and the average duration is 356 days per case. The criminal division handles 3,500 cases per year and the average duration is 459 days. The total number of cases is more than 5,000. Apart from criminal cases, extradition proceedings are the responsibility of the second chamber. The chamber also handles applications for review in criminal cases. There are no considerable backlogs. In principle cassation proceedings take place before a panel of five judges of the Supreme Court in complicated matters. Since 1986 cases that do not qualify as complicated have been decided by a panel of three judges, unless one of these judges is of the opinion that a judgment by a panel of five is required. The possibility to judge with a panel of three has been introduced in order to decrease the workload of the court. For obvious reasons (avoidance of any undue influence) the members of specific panels are not named by the chamber or its chairman but more or less at random by the clerk's office. The panel decides by majority vote. Other members of the chamber also have some influence in the decision-making process. It is open to them to make remarks, especially in the interest of a uniform and consistent application of the law. These remarks can be made orally or via the internal
e-mail system, while the case is under discussion. This is the so-called system of consultations in chambers. These consultations in chambers take place on a weekly basis (Thursdays).

Traditionally, two types of cassation proceedings are to be distinguished (here, again, the Netherlands follows the French model): ordinary cassation appeals and cassation in the interest of the uniform application of the law.

Ordinary cassation appeals are brought by the parties to the lawsuit and may only concern complaints about the application of the law (including procedural law) and the legal reasoning provided. The Supreme Court also monitors whether the lower court satisfied the requirements of due process. The aim of cassation is to preserve legal uniformity, to develop the law and to provide legal protection in individual cases.

Cassation in the interest of the uniform application of the law may only be brought if the original parties to the action have decided not to bring a cassation appeal and if the Procurator General considers it to be in public interest to address legal questions which are not submitted to the court by the parties. The Procurator General receives requests to bring cassation proceedings from the public prosecution service, other courts, government and semi-governmental agencies, businesses, individuals and lawyers. The judgment of the court as a result of cassation in the interest of the law only has consequences for the future and does not affect the original parties to the action. The unsuccessful party in the case at hand remains unsuccessful and the successful party remains successful. The decision of the supreme cassation court is in these cases only relevant for the future.

Apart from bringing cassation in the interest of the uniform application of the law, the Procurator General and his advocates general at the Supreme Court provide the Court with independent advice, known as an advisory opinion (“conclusion”). These opinions, which are written with the help of the research office (each Advocate General has several staff members who help him) represent a substantial and indispensable contribution to the Supreme Court’s work and thereby to the quality of the administration of justice and its development, legal protection and legal uniformity. An advisory opinion generally reviews the facts upon which the Supreme Court must base its judgment, the legal questions the Court must answer, the decision of the court whose judgment is being appealed in cassation and scholarly opinion and existing case law. In addition, a number of possible solutions are sometimes presented. In civil cases and most criminal cases an advisory opinion is compulsory. There is no such requirement in tax cases. The Supreme Court is free to concur with or differ from the advisory opinion and is not obliged to account for itself in this respect. The advisory opinions are published together with the judgments in legal journals and on the internet.

THE SUPREME CASSATION COURT OF THE NETHERLANDS

Summary

The text presents the development of the Dutch Supreme Cassation Court from the early 19th century onwards. The Court adopted the French model of cassation, which is reflected in two types of cassation proceedings: ordinary cassation appeals and cassation in the interest of the uniform application of the law. The text offers an outline of the organisation of the court, status of the Dutch Supreme Cassation Court’s judge as well as the layout of the Court’s chambers. Interestingly, although administrative matters are generally excluded from the Court’s scope of competence, an exception to this rule has been made for tax cases, which are examined by one of the Court’s chambers (the so-called “fiscal or tax chamber”). Additionally, the text not only discusses the question of influx of cases and duration of proceedings, but also presents comparative data with regard to each chamber of the court. The author also touches upon the system of consultations in each chamber, which positively affects the uniformity of the Court’s jurisprudence.

KEYWORDS

cassation court, organization of the court, system of consultations

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE

sąd kasacyjny, organizacja sądu, system konsultacji
2014 is the year of the 150th anniversary of the Judicial Reform in Russia. It was the time of the tsar Alexander II, known in Russian history the time of the “Great Reforms”. Russian judicial system was highly improved during that period. All main procedural principles were established, as well as new judiciary was founded, including courts, judges and attorneys. We can say that the roots of the contemporary civil procedure were put down during that time. Civil procedural code was adopted in 1864 and it remained in force until 1918. Its influence on different Soviet procedural legislation and doctrine was highly significant.

Nowadays our civil judiciary is composed of courts of general jurisdiction, military courts, commercial courts and the intellectual property court. The Supreme Court is the highest court for all of these courts. It was founded in 1923 as the Supreme Court of the USSR and in 1992 it started to function as the court of the Russian Federation.

Last year the big reform was announced and in February the legislation was approved. It is about the unification of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Commercial Court.

Until 2013 there had been two parallel court systems: courts of general jurisdiction and arbitrazh (commercial) courts. Arbitrazh (commercial) courts were charged with settling economic disputes, while courts of general jurisdiction handled disputes between individual citizens. The arbitrazh (commercial) courts system was founded in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the adoption of a market economy. According to the 2013 reform the Supreme Court and Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court should be united in 2014. The Constitution was changed in February 2014 for the second time since its adoption, because it regulates the structure of the judicial system. The Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court will be abolished and its functions transferred to the Supreme Court. This reform idea has proved highly controversial. Its advantages and disadvantages are hotly debated amongst lawyers and members of the judicial community, attracting criticism from some. More than 100 law offices have signed a petition to stop the reform, arguing that the work of the Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) court has been most effective. On the other hand, authors of the reform assert the need to eliminate differences and contradictions in the judicial practice of both supreme courts.


The Supreme Court consists of 170 judges, including the Chief Justice and chairmen of eight chambers. There are several chambers: appeal chamber, judicial chamber on penal cases, judicial chamber on civil cases, judicial chamber on economic cases, judicial chamber on administrative cases, military chamber, disciplinary chamber. Apart from chambers there different structures inside the Supreme Court: the Plenum and the Presidium, and also Scientific and Consulting Council.

The Chief Justice is nominated by the President of Russia and appointed by the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation for a six year term.

Other Supreme Court judges are also nominated by the President of Russia and appointed by the Federation Council. In order to become a judge, a person must be a citizen of Russia, be at least 35 years old, have a legal education, and have at least 10 years of service.

Highest Qualification Panel of judges is a non-governmental organisation of the Russian judiciary that plays a key role in the appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges.

Plenum of the Supreme Court is composed of all judges of the Supreme Court. The Plenum deals with the most complicated matters regarding general jurisdiction courts’ functioning and justice administration. The Plenum views information on practice application studying and generalizing, clarifies it, reviews and decides matters pertaining to the introduction of legal initiatives and requests to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation regarding verification of constitutional laws and other legal acts. The Plenum of the Supreme Court approves the composition of the judicial chambers, panels and the secretary of the Plenum, and the composition of the Scientific and Consulting Council under the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice can participate in the Plenum sessions. They or their substitutes have the right to make correspondent introduction to be heard during the Plenum session. They have the right to express their opinion on matters under discussion. Plenum sessions should be held at least once every four months.

The Presidium of the Supreme Court is the highest and the last judicial instance for cases viewed under the general jurisdiction. The Presidium
consists of the Chief Justice and his deputies. The members of the Presidium of the Supreme Court include some of the most respected judges of the Supreme Court. The total number of Presidium members is 13. The composition of the Presidium is approved upon the introduction of the President of the Russian Federation based on the presentation of the Chief Justice and a positive resolution of the Highest Qualification Panel of judges. The Presidium of the Supreme Court views cases when the majority of its members are present. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in certain cases. Those include: challenging of individual acts of the Federal Assembly and decrees of the President of Russia and the Government of Russia; challenging of delegated legislation of governmental agencies; termination of political parties and all-Russian NGOs; challenging of actions of Central Electoral Commission of Russia when organizing presidential elections, State Duma elections or referendum. The Supreme Court may also hear criminal cases against members of the Federation Council of Russia and the State Duma and federal judges at their discretion. Presidium sessions should be held at least once a month.

The Academic Consultative Council is a body created in order to assist the Supreme Court in various legal and academic matters. It comprises members of the Supreme Court, academics, practising lawyers, and law enforcement officers. Its composition is approved by the Plenum. It is presided over by the Chief Justice. The Scientific and Consulting Council elaborates scientifically based recommendations on the most complex and important issues of the judicial practice. These recommendations for the Plenum may serve as clarification of judicial practice issues, preparation of law projects and other legal acts, specific case trials.

There are also large numbers of clerks who work for the agency for judicial practice analysing and generalizing, legislation agency, personnel and state service agency, administrative department, planning and financing agency, economic agency, international law department, law information department and other agencies.

The official journal of the Supreme Court is “The Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation” that publishes the most important decisions of the Presidium.

The 2014 reform of the Russian Supreme Court has strengthened its powers and competence. Its organisational structure has been changed so that it is now the higher justice authority not only in civil, but also in economic cases.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT - ISSUES OF PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Tadeusz Erecinski, Piotr Rylski, Karol Weitz – Preface ........................................... 7
Lori Cadet – Introduction to the conference ................................................................. 9

Part I Supreme Court and its functions in the judicial system
Richard Marcus – A Common Law Perspective on the Supreme Court
and its Functions ........................................................................................................... 15
Aleš Galič – A Civil Law Perspective on the Supreme Court and its Functions ...... 44
Christian Charruault – Le pourvoi en cassation en matière civile ......................... 87
Walerian Sanetra – La Cour Suprême et ses fonctions dans le système judiciaire
polonais ....................................................................................................................... 103

Part II Organisation of Supreme Courts
Alan Uzelac – Supreme Courts in the 21st Century: should organisation follow
the function? ................................................................................................................ 125
Remco van Rhee – The Supreme Cassation Courts of the Netherlands
(Hoge Raad der Nederlanden) .................................................................................... 140
Dmitry Maleshin – The Supreme Court of Russia .................................................... 144

Part III Access to Supreme Court
Lori Cadet – Introduction to Part III ........................................................................... 151
John Sorabji – Access to the Supreme Court – the English Approach ................. 152
Soraya Amrani Mekki – L’Accès aux cours suprêmes – rapport français ............... 172
Chiara Besso – Access to the Supreme Court – the Italian Approach ................. 191
Michael Stürner – Access to the Federal Court of Justice in Germany ............... 194
Tatjana Zurloska-Kamilovska, Tatjana Shterjova – Admissibility of Remedies Filed
to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Macedonia in Civil Matters ............... 214
Tadeusz Zembrzuski – Access to the Supreme Court – Polish Approach .......... 233

Part IV Contributions to the Conference
Kinga Flaga-Gieruszyńska – Mandatory Representation by an Attorney or Legal
Counsel and Access to the Courts in Civil Cases ...................................................... 247
Edyta Gapska – Legal and Historical Perspective on Public Character of Cassation
Complaint in Polish Civil Procedure ........................................................................ 267
Agieszka Golab – Cassation Attorneys in the Polish Civil Proceedings ............... 302
Baosheng Zhang, Yin Li – The Supreme People’s Court of China in the Process
of Judicial Reform ...................................................................................................... 320